

Next Date:
31/01/2023

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BEFORE HON'BLE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL
WESTERN ZONE BENCH, PUNE

ORIGINAL APPLICATION NO.106/2022(WZ)

BETWEEN

Vanshakti & Anr.

.....

Applicant

Versus

Union of India & ors.

.....

Respondent

AFFIDAVIT BY RESPONDENT NO. 2 and 3 Environment
Department, Govt. of Maharashtra
AND
Maharashtra Coastal Zone Management Authority (MCZMA)

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Date: 30-Jan-2023

Place: Mumbai

Filed by:



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BE (Mechanical), ME (Industrial Management) VJTI Mumbai
Chartered Engineer, FIE, Arbitrator-IIIE, LLM **ADVOCATE**

MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

1. The present OA is in principal a challenge to the MoEFCC Gazette Notification dated 18/01/2019. The CZMP are prepared according to this notification.
2. In the summary and broad overview mentioned in detail on pages 5 to 7 of the OA, the notification is assassinated point by point. The main arguments in OA are that this notification, in many ways, has diluted the stringent provisions of the earlier CRZ notification of 2011 and relaxed the norms.
3. The OA is filed under s.14 of the 'National Green Tribunal Act 2010' raising 'substantial question related to environment'. The limitation period for filing application u/s.14(3) is of six months, with grace period for condonation of delay of 60 days after that.
4. The cause of action for this has first arose on publication of this Gazette notification on 18/01/2019. The limitation period of six months end on 17/07/2019. The present OA has been filed on 27/10/2022. There is delay of 1198 days (40 months) in filing this application, beyond the period of limitation of six months.
5. Limitation period of six month has ended on 17/07/2019 and even the grace period is over on 15/09/2019. The delay can be condoned, up to grace period 60 days, that too only if the applicant is prevented from filing this application in time.

6. As such, this Hon'ble National Green Tribunal can not entertain this application for want of jurisdiction, due to bar of limitation.

7. Limitation is the substantive statutory right and protection given to all other stake holders. If such OA crop up and are entertained at subsequent date at the leisure of the applicants, there shall be high uncertainty in taking up effective steps for implementation of such notifications. The projects undertaken, acts done or omitted to be done, shall be always under fear, risk and uncertainty.

8. As such, on this ground of limitation alone, the OA needs to be dismissed at this stage itself and without going in to the merits of the matter.

9. The respondent had requested for time to file reply on merit. But the matter has been listed after notice for admission. But after going through Synopsis and Diary of Events, it has been found that the OA is hopelessly time barred. Therefore, these written submissions are being filed, opposing the entertaining of this OA and admission itself on this preliminary issue.

10. Considering the short time available, the written arguments are being submitted after taking approval from the competent authorities. The submissions are therefore made for and on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 and 3 with their approval and on their instructions.

11. This Hon'ble Tribunal on 18/01/2023 has passed the

similar order of dismissal of the other OA 32/2022(WZ). The issues raised in that OA and so also the prayers, were in essence of the similar nature. The reasons stated and references made of the various litigations, HC and SC orders in favour of the applicant, for condonation of delay are also of similar nature.

12. As such for the sake of judicial discipline, equity, consistency in approach and treatment given to similar contentions in essence to the OAs of the same nature, this OA too needs to be dismissed at this stage only. The ORDER in that matter is enclosed for ready reference and record. **[Ax. A ■]**.

Date: 30-January-2023

Place: Mumbai



Advocate for Respondent No. 2 & 3

**BEFORE THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL
WESTERN ZONE BENCH, PUNE**

(By Video Conferencing)

**INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.32 OF 2022 (WZ)
IN
ORIGINAL APPLICATION NO.32 OF 2022 (WZ)**

Colaba Koliwada Jamshedji Bunder
Samaj Swanaseva Maryadit and Anr. Applicants

Versus

Union of India through the Secretary,
Ministry of Environment and Forests
and Climate Change and othersRespondents

Date of hearing: 18.01.2023

**CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH KUMAR SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER
HON'BLE DR. VIJAY KULKARNI, EXPERT MEMBER**

Applicants : Ms. Ronita Bhattacharya, Advocate
Respondents : Mr. Rahul Garg, Advocate for R-1
Ms. Manasi Joshi, Advocate for R-2 and R-5

ORDER

1. This application has been moved by the Applicants seeking condonation of delay in filing Original Application No. 32/2022 (WZ) whereby it has been prayed that a direction be issued to Respondent No. 1 – MoEF&CC, Respondent No. 2 – MCZMA and Respondent No.3 – NCZMA to withdraw with immediate effect the approved CZMP maps of 2018 prepared under CRZ Notification of 2019 as well as approved CZMP maps for Mumbai and Mumbai Sub-Urban Districts under impugned CRZ Notification 2019 and they be directed to provide fresh CZMP maps as per the guidelines under CRZ Notification. It is further prayed that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 be directed to withdraw with immediate effect the

draft CZMP maps released in 2020 for Sindhudurg, Ratnagiri, Thane, Palghar, CIDCO, Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation and Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust, under CRZ Notification 2019. Further it is prayed that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Respondent No. 4 – State of Maharashtra, Respondent No. 5 – Environment Department of the State of Maharashtra and Respondent No. 6 – Department of Fisheries, State of Maharashtra i.e. all the Respondents be directed to identify, demarcate and earmark all the fishing villages, fishing zones, fish breeding areas, landing centres, common areas/properties of the fishermen communities, fishing jetties, ice plants, fish drying platforms or areas infrastructure facilities of fishing and local communities such as dispensaries, roads, schools, and the like as CRZ – III on the CZMPs in accordance with Annexure I of CRZ Notification 2011, including the color coding of each CRZ I.

2. It is further prayed by the Applicants that the CRZ Notification dated 18.01.2019 be quashed and that Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 5 be directed to continue to implement the CRZ Notification 2011 till the finalization of fresh CRZ Notification; it is further prayed that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 be directed to carry out ground truthing with the help of local / fisher communities and to ensure that HTL and Hazard Line are clearly marked along with finalization of cadastral maps in the scale of 1:3960; further it is prayed that Respondents be directed to stop all ongoing construction / development / land filling activities inside CRZ areas until the fresh CZMPs are prepared in accordance with Annexure – 1 to CRZ Notification 2011 and the preparation of cadastral maps; it is further prayed that Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 be restrained from granting any new development / construction permissions / clearances near / inside fishing villages, common areas used by the fishing community in CRZ – III areas, fishing zone and fish breeding areas in Maharashtra, except for the purpose of fishing community; further it is prayed that Respondent

No. 1 be directed to ensure that till fresh CZMP maps are prepared, 1996 CZMP Maps shall form the basis for granting any new permissions.

3. In the body of the Application, it is submitted that the Applicants have filed the present Original Application under Section 14 read with Sections 15 and 18 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. Section 14(3) provides that no application for adjudication of dispute under this Section shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within a period of six months from the date on which the cause of action for such dispute first arose; provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. The present Application is well within 6 months' period as is stipulated above for the following reasons:

- (a) As per clause 6.1 from impugned notification, until such time as fresh CZMPs are prepared and sanctioned under the impugned notification, the provisions of impugned notification shall not apply and the CZMP as per provisions of CRZ notification, 2011 shall continue to be followed for appraisal and CRZ clearance to such projects. Only two such CZMPs have been prepared under the impugned notification for Mumbai City and Mumbai Sub-Urban District, which have been approved vide notification dated 29.09.2021, but are yet to be uploaded on the website of MCZMA so as to bring them into effect. Therefore, the impugned notification has not yet been brought into effect and the CZMP maps for Mumbai City and Mumbai Sub-Urban District has also not been brought into effect. The other maps for rest of the State remain as drafts which can be notified on a later date.
- (b) The Applicants were also petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2231/2021, filed on 19.03.2020 before the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay, prior to the CZMP maps of Mumbai City and Mumbai Sub-Urban District

being approved on 29.09.2021. The said Petition was withdrawn on 07.10.2021 after the Hon'ble High Court indicated that appropriate forum to hear the challenges raised would be this Tribunal and also directed that the period spent from 19.03.2020 to 07.10.2021 would be excluded from the period of limitation under Section 14 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.

(c) In light of extension of limitation granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its order dated 10.01.2022 in M.A. No. 21/2022 in SMW(C) No. 03/2020 in cognizance for extension of limitation due to COVID-19 Pandemic, present Application is well within limitation period.

(d) In the present Application the challenges raised are with respect to the CZMPs prepared under the CRZ Notification 2011 between the period of September 2018 to April 2019. These CZMPs have been challenged under Section 15 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. The act of Respondent Authorities in preparation of incorrect and glaringly illegal maps have harmed and would continue to harm the ecology of the coastal area and therefore, it forms a continuous cause of action against the respondents. Section 15(3) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 provides limitation of 5 years and therefore, the said relief would be covered within the limitation period.

4. Further it is submitted in the Application that the Applicants have faced such trouble in compiling relevant documents as well as in getting response to the queries raised by them under RTI and accumulating all other pertinent documents. Therefore, by way of abundant precaution, this delay condonation application has been moved which may be allowed.

5. The Notices were served upon the Respondents. In response thereto, Respondent No. 1 – MoEF&CC is represented by learned counsel

Mr. Garg, who has appeared today and submits that he does not want to file any reply affidavit in this Application.

6. From the side of Respondent No. 2 MCZMA and Respondent No. 5 Environment Department, learned counsel Ms. Manasi Joshi has appeared and submits that reply affidavit has been filed wherein stand taken is as follows:

No explanation has been offered by the Applicants for not approaching this Tribunal after the notification dated 18.01.2019 (impugned herein) was issued. The Applicants had approached the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay by filing Writ Petition No. 2231 of 2021 on 19.03.2020 which was later on withdrawn on 07.10.2021 pursuant to which the same was dismissed as withdrawn.

7. The learned counsel for the Applicants has vehemently argued that paragraph no. 6.1 of the notification dated 18.01.2019 (impugned before us) clearly states that the CZMPs framed under CRZ Notification, 2011 were to be revised and submitted to the Ministry of Environment for approval at the earliest and that all the project activity attracting the provisions of this notification would be required to be appraised as per updated CZMPs issued under this notification but until and unless the CZMPs were so revised or updated, CZMPs as per CRZ Notification 2011, were to continue for appraisal of CRZ clearance to such projects. She has emphasized that in Mumbai City and Mumbai Sub-Urban Districts, CZMPs have been finalized and notified in 2022, which are being challenged by the present original application. Therefore, the period of limitation should be computed from April, 2022 while this Original Application was already filed on 27.02.2022. This appears to us to be erroneous because according to the learned counsel for the Applicants, the CZMPs for Mumbai City and Mumbai Sub-Urban Districts were notified in April, 2022 while the present Original Application was already

in existence as the same has been filed on 27.02.2022, which would mean that even before arising of cause of action, this application had been filed. What we find from the entire prayer clauses is that the basic relief appears to be seeking quashing of CRZ Notification dated 18.01.2019 because all other reliefs emanate out of that relief. In our opinion, therefore, the said CRZ Notification dated 18.01.2019 ought to have been challenged within the prescribed period of limitation which is six months and the discretionary period of further 60 days subject to the satisfaction of this Tribunal with respect to the delay being genuine.

8. The learned counsel for the Applicants has also drawn our attention to the order dated 07.10.2021 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in Writ Petition No. 2231/2021, which was preferred with the prayer seeking quashing of the notification, impugned herein, vide which the said Writ Petition has been dismissed, observing as follows:

“2. This writ petition seeks an order for quashing a Notification bearing no. G.S.R.37 (E) dated January 18, 2019 on the ground of the same being unconstitutional and ultra vires the Environment (Protection) Act 1986 and the rules framed thereunder as well as other consequential reliefs.

3. After hearing progressed to some length and attention of Ms. Bector, learned advocate for the petitioners, was drawn to the provisions of sections 14 and 15 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 as well as the decision of the coordinate Bench of this Court dated January 12, 2021 in Writ Petition No. 188 of 2020 [Maria Thelma Suresh Poojary and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.], she prays for withdrawal of this writ petition. She further prays for liberty to the petitioners to move the National Green Tribunal (hereafter “the Tribunal” for short). A prayer is also made for condonation of delay in approaching the Tribunal.

4. The prayer for withdrawal is granted. The writ petition stands dismissed as withdrawn. There shall be no order as to costs.

5. There can be no order on the petitioners' prayer for condonation of delay at this stage since the petitioners have not even applied before the Tribunal. Question of condonation of delay would arise only if the Tribunal is approached. The prayer for condonation of delay is, therefore, rejected; however, this order shall not preclude the petitioners to approach the Tribunal seeking condonation of delay by filing an appropriate application. Since the writ petition was pending on the file of this Court from March 19, 2020 till this date, it shall be open to the petitioners to seek the benefit of exclusion of such time

period with reference to section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 if permissible in law. We hope and trust that if such a prayer is made, the same shall be considered in accordance with law.

6. All contentions on merit are left open.”

9. Simultaneously, the learned counsel for the applicants has also argued that Public Interest Litigation (PIL) No.28/2021 was preferred by **Vanashakti & Another** against **Union of India and others**, before the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, wherein the notification impugned herein was challenged and vide order dated 08.10.2021, the said PIL was dismissed, by observing as follows:

“10. Power conferred on the High Courts by Article 226 of the Constitution is very wide. Article 226 in terms does not place any limit on the Court's power. However, writ remedy being discretionary, the power has to be exercised judiciously bearing in mind certain self-imposed restrictions propounded by authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court. A writ court may decline interference if an alternative, efficacious and speedy remedy is available to the petitioner who approaches it with a grievance that his legal right has been infringed. This is not based on any rule of law, rather it is based on a rule of policy, convenience or discretion. There are four exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court and if any one of such exceptions is present in a particular case, the writ court may not to hesitate to entertain the plea, However, here we are not concerned with an alternative remedy available to the petitioners in the sense that they can choose between two remedies made available by law. On the contrary, a remedy seems to be available to them under the NGT Act; and if we hold that the petitioners' plea is such that it can be entertained and decided by the forum created by the NGT Act, which also provides an appellate remedy before the Supreme Court on any one of the grounds mentioned in section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it would seem to us that the NGT Act instead of providing an alternative remedy, provides the first remedy to an aggrieved party who seeks to raise a substantial question relating to environment; and after such remedy is exhausted, he may explore further remedies as law would provide. Apart from this, delay or lathes in seeking redress before the writ court is one of the other restrictions based whereon a plea, howsoever meritorious, may not be entertained. We propose to proceed bearing these in mind.

18. The first question that would necessarily fall for our consideration is, whether the impugned notification is a delegated legislation? The answer, for the following reasons, cannot but be in the negative.

20. We need not burden this order with any discussion on what delegated legislation is. Suffice to say, the petitioners are laboring under a misconception that the impugned notification is a law brought into force by the Central Government in exercise of the power of delegated legislation conferred by the Environment Act. Far from it, we see the impugned notification as one which is a statutory order of the Central Government made in pursuance of what is called in Administrative Law as 'administrative delegation'. A legislature may confer upon an administrative authority not only the power to make rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of a statute but also the power to apply the law to particular cases by making orders in exercise of the statutory power. So far as the validity of such orders themselves are concerned, they are subject to the doctrine of ultra vires and must, therefore, be within the limits set by the statute. Sections 6 and 25 specifically empower the Central Government to make rules in respect of all or any of the matters referred to in section 3 and for carrying out the purposes of the Environment Act, respectively. Pertinently, the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 have been framed by the Central Government in exercise of power conferred by sections 6 and 25 of the Environment Act. These rules, being delegated legislation, are distinct and different from the statutory order made under section 3. The impugned notification not having been issued in exercise of the rule making power of the Central Government, cannot be seen as a product of delegation legislation in the sense it is understood in Administrative Law. This being our conclusion as to the nature of power that was exercised to bring into existence the impugned notification, all the cited decisions have no application.

21. The real concern of the petitioners is that the measures brought about by the impugned notification are insufficient to prevent unscientific and unsustainable development, and ecological destruction, and it is claimed that they are not intended to protect life. The phrase "substantial question relating to environment" appearing in sub-section (1) of section 14 has been defined in clause (m) of sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Environment Act. It reads as follows:

(m) 'substantial question relating to environment' shall include an instance where, -

(i) there is a direct violation of a specific statutory environmental obligation by a person by which, -

(A) the community at large other than an individual or group of individuals is affected or likely to be affected by the environmental consequences; or

(B) the gravity of damage to the environment or property is substantial; or

(C) the damage to public health is broadly measurable;

(ii) the environmental consequences relate to a specific activity or a point source of pollution;"

All the concerns that the petitioners have urged do stand covered by 'substantial question relating to environment and would also include an attempt to enforce their legal rights in the pursuit of protecting the

environment; therefore, their plea is squarely covered by section 14(1) of the NGT Act.

23. In **Techi Tagi Tara** (*supra*), the Supreme Court has held, in the context of the NGT Act that a 'dispute' would be the assertion of a right or an interest or a claim met by contrary claims on the other side. Based on the aforesaid guidance provided by the Supreme Court, we hold that the case laid by the petitioner before us, if the same had been laid before the Tribunal, would partake the character of a 'dispute' if the respondents had chosen to contest the same by countering it. There is absolutely no merit in the contention advanced and, thus, it stands rejected.

24. This takes us to the last contention. It is the petitioners' claim that changes brought about in the CRZ by the impugned notification would amount to a modification of a substantial nature in the Development Control Regulations under the MRTP Act and this is an issue which the Tribunal is incapable to decide in view of the provisions of the NGT Act.

28. The Tribunal's jurisdiction to deal with environmental issues is so wide and expansive that literally speaking, 'everything under the sun' raising substantial question relating to environment can be dealt with by it. It would matter little that in its pursuit to further the objects for which the Tribunal has been brought into existence as well as to ensure protection of environment and conservation of forests and other natural resources including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment, any other enactment is required to be considered. So long as the basic question remains the same, i.e., the Tribunal is either approached or is duty bound to secure proper implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I of the NGT Act and a substantial question in relation thereto arises, and the decision of the Tribunal on such question would beneficially impact the environment, merely because in the process of decision making the Tribunal may be required to consider provisions of any other enactment would not denude it of its fundamental and predominant task of taking decisions that would advance the object of the Schedule I enactments as also to secure the ends of justice in any particular case. We may refer in this connection to rule 24 of the National Green Tribunal (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 2011 framed by the Central Government.

29. There is one final reason for which we are not persuaded to accept the contention of Mr. Dhond. There could be a situation that the impugned notification is also under challenge before the Tribunal on the first two contentions raised by the petitioners, as noted above, in an application under section 14 of the NGT Act. If this writ petition were entertained, which raises the fourth contention also, as noted above, the Court would be tasked to decide the first two and the fourth contentions on its own merits. The Tribunal also being in se/sin of the first two contentions, there would always be a possibility of conflicting opinions being rendered by this Court and the NGT in respect of the same subject matter of challenge which, in our opinion, would be absolutely undesirable.

31. We are also minded to observe that no Court ought to interfere in respect of matters over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction, or else

the very purpose for enactment of the NGT Act would stand defeated. The Tribunal, having regard to its constitution, would be better equipped to deal with all points of law and facts, which could be intricate, with the expert assistance that is available at its level.

32. *The discussion must end by quoting paragraph 40 of the decision of the Supreme Court in **Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan vs. Union of India**, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 326, reading as follows:*

"40. Keeping in view the provisions and scheme of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (for short "the NGT Act") particularly Sections 14, 29, 30 and 38(5), it can safely be concluded that the environmental issues and matters covered under the NGT Act, Schedule I should be instituted and litigated before the National Green Tribunal (for short "NGT"). Such approach may be necessary to avoid likelihood of conflict of orders between the High Courts and NGT. Thus, in unambiguous terms, we direct that all the matters instituted after coming into force of the NGT Act and which are covered under the provisions of the NGT Act and/or in Schedule I to the NGT Act shall stand transferred and can be instituted only before NGT. This will help in rendering expeditious and specialised justice in the field of environment to all concerned." (emphasis supplied)

33. *We, therefore, reject this contention too.*

34. *There is one other reason why we feel disinclined to entertain the writ petition. The impugned notification is dated January 18, 2019. The writ petition has been presented on March 25, 2021. There is no explanation offered for the belated approach. True it is, the entire nation was in a state of disarray from March 23, 2020 but the first wave in Mumbai started receding from November, 2020. This period could count for exclusion and not the rest. The delay is, thus, unreasonable."*

10. Against the above order of dismissal of PIL, the petitioners in that case approached the Hon'ble Apex Court, challenging the said order by filing Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.20495 of 2021 wherein the following order was passed on 30.09.2022:

"In the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has rightly relegated the petitioners to approach the National Green Tribunal (NGT) as number of technical issues arise which can very well be dealt with by the NGT are involved. Therefore, it is appropriate that the petitioners approach the NGT, as observed by the High Court. The Special Leave Petition stands dismissed.

However, it is observed that if the petitioners approach the NGT within a period of four weeks from today, the proceedings be considering in accordance with law and on its own merits without raising the issue with respect to limitation.

All the contentions and defences which may be available to the respective parties are kept open to be considered by the NGT in accordance with law and on its own merits.

Pending application (s), if any stand disposed of.”

11. The learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon the following citations and relevant paragraphs thereof were read out before us in order to convince that this Tribunal has jurisdiction to condone the delay even beyond discretionary period in cases of violation, although we could not find anything to that effect having been stated in the set of judgments which have been relied upon by the applicant. For the sake of convenience, the relevant paragraphs from the judgments, relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant are quoted herein below:.

- (i) *Federation of Rainbow Warriors through its Secretary, David Rodrigues and 2 Ors. Vs. Union of India, through the Secretary, Ministry of Environment, New Delhi and Anr. (Public Interest Litigation No.19 of 2019, with other PILs, decided by High Court of Bombay at Goa on 03.01.2023)***

“7. Some of the petitioners, including, in particular, Mr Kashinath Shetye, expressed apprehension on the issue of limitation. Mr Chodankar, learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government made it clear that if the petitioners indeed approach the NGT within 4 weeks from today, the issue of limitation will not be raised. This statement is entirely consistent with the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its order dated 30.09.2022 disposing of the above SLP.

8. Even otherwise, all these petitioners, were bonafidely pursuing their petitions before this Court. The issue of alternate remedy was also pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the challenge against the decision in Vanashakti (supra). Therefore, consistent with the order made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we also observe that in case the petitioners approach the NGT within 4 weeks from today, the proceedings they institute will be considered in accordance with law and on their own merits without raising the issue with respect to limitation. Further, all contentions of all parties are expressly left open because we have not examined the merits and these petitions are being disposed of only by relegating the petitioners to avail of the alternate remedy available before the NGT.

- (ii) *Sridevi Datla Vs. Union of India and others; (2021)5SCC 321***

“30. This court is of the opinion that there is merit in the appellant’s argument. The respondents, especially, the project applicant, had urged that the appellant is an interested party, and cannot be called a public-spirited citizen, because she had opposed acquisition of land for the airport and therefore, was able to access legal advice at the High Court stage. There is, in our opinion, nothing in the NGT Act which excludes parties who would be directly affected by a project, that has environmental repercussions, from accessing the tribunal (NGT). Likewise, characterizing the nature of legal advice that can be accessed for challenging land acquisition, as similar to a challenge to environmental clearance which involves application of mind to technical issues in a detailed manner, would be unfair and simplistic. Scientific or technical support – apart from expert professional legal advice is necessary, if the NGT were to be approached. In these circumstances, this court is of the opinion that given the mandate of the NGT Act, the exercise of discretion, as was done in this case, to reject the appeal by dismissing the application for condonation of delay, on the ground that no sufficient cause was shown, was erroneous and based on a narrow reading of the law. An appeal to the NGT in such matters is no ordinary matter; it has the potential of irrevocably changing the environment with the possibility of likely injury. Application of judicial mind by an independent tribunal in such cases, at the first appellate stage, is almost a necessity.”

**(iii) Jaya Mathachan Vs. Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change;
2021 SCC OnLine NGT 1024**

“13.It was alleged in the application that she will have to consult a lawyer in New Delhi and collected certain materials and thereafter, filed the appeal before the Principal Bench and it was returned as the appeal will have to be filed before the Southern Zone Bench and accordingly, it was filed before this Bench.

18.Further, in the recent decision in Sridevi Datla Vs. Union of India & Ors. which was taken up by the appellant in that case against the order passed by the Tribunal in M.A. No.231 of 2017 in Appeal No.18/2020 as Civil Appeal No.3136 of 2020 dated 31.07.2020 holding that the appeal was filed beyond 90 days, as it was filed on the 91st day and also after holding that the delay of even 90 days has not been properly explained, but the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed that this Tribunal, while considering the delay condonation, should not have taken such a pedantic view that each day delay had not been properly explained, especially when the substantial environmental issues have been raised and set aside the order passed by this Tribunal and condoned the delay in filing the appeal and sent back the matter to this Tribunal to consider the appeal on merit.

19.So, if the principle laid down in the above decision has been followed, the Court must be liberal in considering the condonable period of delay in filing the appeal and an opportunity must be given to the parties to

meet the case on merit, instead of dismissing the appeal on technical ground of limitation.”

(iv) Dnyaneshwar Vihnu Shedge v. Union of India and Ors.;
2012 SCC OnLine NGT 80

“10. Admittedly, the Appeal has not been filed within thirty days of the impugned order. But then it has been filed within ninety days, thus, in consonance with the provision of Section 16 of the NGT Act, this Tribunal, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the Appeal, entertain the same, if the same is filed within 60 (sixty) days after 30 (thirty) days from the date of the order sought to be impugned.

11. As far as the explanation given by the Appellant that he approached and discussed with the local villagers and other project affected persons sought their approval and consent and thereafter travelled to Pune consulted an Advocate and on his advice downloaded the impugned order from the website of the MoEF and then proceeded to Delhi, contacted the Advocate and got the Appeal filed. A litigant is legitimately entitled to put forth in a proceeding like this and plead and explain the delay.

12. Respondent No.3 repudiating the stand taken by the Appellant tried to convince this Tribunal that the Appellant took active part in the movement initiated to stop project implementation. Since long he had contacts with the social activists who are opposing the project, thus the plea of ignorance taken by the Appellant is only an afterthought, and is neither bonafide nor justified.

13. On consideration of the submissions advanced interse by the parties, we feel in a case like the present one, where the Environmental impact of the project on local population in terms of their environmental harm, has to be assessed, the approach of this Tribunal, especially set up for the said purpose, should be liberal and not "hyper-technical".

14. The nature of the disputes, as would be evident, from the aims and objective of the NGT Act, this Tribunal is expected to adjudicate upon, is not really a lis between the litigant parties and or adversary litigation. The jurisdiction of this Tribunal is necessarily a wider one whereby the impact of the decision granting EC vis-à-vis the effect thereof on the local community or environment in general and ecology has to be considered. The Tribunal is expected to adopt a broad and liberal approach rather than narrow and cribbed one.”

(v) Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao and Ors.;
(2002)3 SCC 195

“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of [Section 5](#) of the Act or [Order 22](#)

Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way."

(vi) Padmabati Mohapatra, w/o Sri Ras Bihar MOhapatra v. Union of India & Ors.;
2013 SCC OnLine NGT 98

"20. The applicant has been able to show sufficient cause for 23 days' delay in filing the present appeal. It is correct that the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to condone the delay where the appeal is filed beyond the prescribed period of 30+60 days in terms of Section 16 of the NGT Act. In the present case, however there is no delay in excess of 90 days. In fact, both the respondents have failed to discharge their obligations in accordance with law. They failed to put the EC order in the public domain and ensure that any aggrieved person is able to access such order in accordance with the prescribed procedure and law. In fact, both MoEF and the project proponent are at fault and cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own wrong.

21. The respondents have failed to discharge their composite obligations comprehensively. Thus, in the present case, it is not possible in law to define a date when the order would actually or deemed to be communicated to the applicant. The communication of the order being incomplete in law, the limitation cannot be reckoned from any of the dates stated by any of the respondents. While construing the law of limitation, this Tribunal must take a pragmatic view balancing the rights

of the parties to the us. The objection of limitation when renders a petition barred by time, it takes away the right of one and protects the right of the other. One who raises an objection of limitation, onus lies on him to show that the requirements of law, triggering the period of limitation, have been satisfied.”

(vii) Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha and Ors.;
2021 SCC OnLine SC 897

“23. This is how the proposed forum was made free from the rules of evidence and the NGT was permitted to lay down its own procedure to entertain oral and documentary evidence, consult experts etc. The observance of the principles of natural justice was however mandated.

63. The NGT being one of its own kind of forum, commends us to consider the concept of a sui generis role, for the institution. The structure of Sui generis institutions was explained in *Paramjit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab*²⁰, wherein Justice S. Saghir Ahmad spoke thus for a Division Bench,

“14. The concept of sui generis is applied quite often with reference to resolution of disputes in the context of international law. When the conventions formulated by compacting nations do not cover any area territorially or any subject topically, then the body to which such power to arbiter is entrusted acts sui generis, that is, on its own and not under any law.”

64. In *DG NHAI vs. Aam Aadmi Lokmanch*²¹, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat commenting on the sui generis role of the NGT, so appropriately stated as follows:-

“38. A conjoint reading of [Sections 14, 15](#) and the Schedules would lead one to infer that the NGT has circumscribed jurisdiction to deal with, adjudicate, and wherever needed, direct measures such as payment of compensation, or make restitutionary directions in cases where the violation (i.e. harm caused due to pollution or exposure to hazards, etc.) are the result of infraction of any enactment listed in the first schedule. Yet, that, interpretation, in the opinion of this court, is not warranted.

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76. The power and jurisdiction of the NGT under [Sections 15\(1\)\(b\)](#) and (c) are not restitutionary, in the sense of restoring the environment to the position it was before the practise impugned, or before the incident occurred. The NGT's jurisdiction in one sense is a remedial one, based on a reflexive exercise of its

powers. In another sense, based on the nature of the abusive practice, its powers can also be preventive.

77. As a quasi-judicial body exercising both appellate jurisdiction over regulatory bodies' orders and directions (under Section 16) and its original jurisdiction under Sections 14, 15 and 17 of the NGT Act, the tribunal, based on the cases and applications made before it, is an expert regulatory body. Its personnel include technically qualified and experienced members. The powers it exercises and directions it can potentially issue, impact not merely those before it, but also state agencies and state departments whose views are heard, after which general directions to prevent the future occurrence of incidents that impact the environment, are issued.”

65. In that case, this Court repelled the argument for a restricted jurisdiction for the NGT, and fittingly observed in paragraph 76 that the powers conferred on the NGT are both reflexive and preventive and the role of the NGT was recognized in paragraph 77 as “an expert regulatory body”, which can issue general directions also albeit within the statutory framework.

66. The above discussion would advise us to say that the NGT was conceived as a specialized forum not only as a like substitute for a civil court but more importantly to take over all the environment related cases from the High Courts and the Supreme Court. Many of those cases transferred to the NGT, emanated in the superior courts and it would be appropriate thus to assume that similar power to initiate suo motu proceedings should also be available with the NGT.

67. The NGT is a Tribunal with sui generis characteristic, with the special and all-encompassing jurisdiction to protect the environment. Besides its adjudicatory role as an appellate authority, it is also conferred with the responsibility to discharge role of supervisory body and to decide substantial questions relating to the environment. The necessity of having a specialized body, with the expertise to handle multi-dimensional environmental issues allows for an all-encompassing framework for environmental justice. The technical expertise that may be required to address evolving environmental concerns would definitely require a flexible institutional mechanism for its effective exercise.”

(viii) Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India & Ors.;
(1996)5 SCC 647

“10. The traditional concept that development and ecology are opposed to each other, is no longer acceptable. "Sustainable Development is the answer. In the International sphere "Sustainable Development" as a concept came to be known for the first time in the Stockholm Declaration of 1972. Thereafter, in 1987 the concept was

given a definite shape by the World Commission on Environment and Development in its report called *Court Common Future*. The Commission was chaired by the then Prime Minister of Norway Ms. G.H. Brundtland and as such the report is popularly known as "Brundtland Report" 1991 the World Conservation Union, United Nations Environment Programme and World Wide Fund for Nature, jointly came out with a document called "Caring for the Earth" which is a strategy for sustainable living. Finally, came the Earth Summit held in June, 1992 at Rio which saw the largest gathering of world leaders ever in the history - deliberating and chalking out a blue print for the survival of the planet. Among the tangible achievements of the Rio Conference was the signing of two conventions, one on biological diversity and another on climate change. These conventions were signed by 153 nations. The delegates also approved by consensus three non binding documents namely, a Statement on Forestry Principles a declaration of principles on environmental policy and development and initiatives and Agenda 21 a programme of action into the next century in areas like poverty, population and pollution. during the two decades from Stockholm to Rio "sustainable Development" and came to be accepted as a viable concept to eradicate poverty and improve the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity of the supporting eco-systems. "sustainable Development: as defined by the Brundtland Report means "Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs". We have no hesitation in holding that "Sustainable Development' As a balancing concept between ecology and development has been accepted as a part of the Customary International Law though its salient feature have yet to be finalised by the International Law Jurists.

11. Some of the salient principles of "Sustainable Development", as culled-out from Brundtland Report and other international documents, are Inter-Generational Equity, Use and Conservation of Nature Resources, Environmental Protection, the Precautionary Principle, Polluter Pays principle, Obligation to assist and cooperate, Eradication of Poverty and Financial Assistance to the developing countries. We are, however, of the vies that "The Precautionary Principle" and "The Polluter Pays" principle are essential features of "Sustainable Development". The "Precautionary Principle" - in the context of the municipal law - means.

(i) Environment measures - by the State Government and the statutory Authorities must anticipate, prevent' and attack the causes of environmental degradation.

(ii) Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage lack of scientific certainty should not be used as the reason for postponing, measures to prevent environmental depredation.

(iii)The "Onus of proof" is on the actor or the developer/industrial to show that his action is environmentally benign.

12. "The Polluter Pays" principle has been held to be a sound principle by this Court Indian Council for Enviro- Legal Action vs. Union of India J.T. 1996 (2) 196. The Court observed,

".....We are of the opinion that any principle evolved in this behalf should be simple practical and suited to the conditions obtaining in this country".

The Court ruled that :

"....Once the activity carried on is hazardous or inherently dangerous, the person carrying on such activity is liable to make good the loss caused to any other person by his activity irrespective of the fact whether he took reasonable care while carrying on his activity. The rule is premised upon the very nature of the activity carried on".

Consequently the polluting industries are "absolutely liable to compensate for the harm caused by them to villagers in the affected area, to the soil and to the underground water and hence, they are bound to take all necessary measures to remove sludge and other pollutants lying in the affected areas". The "Polluter Pays" principle as interpreted by this Court means that the absolute liability for harm to the environment extends not only to compensate the victims of pollution but also the cost of restoring the environmental degradation. Remediation of the damaged environment is part of the process of "Sustainable Development" and as such polluter is liable to pay the cost to the individual sufferers as well as the cost of reversing the damaged ecology.

13. The precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle have been accepted as part of the law of the land. [Article 21](#) of the Constitution of India guarantees protection of life and personal liberty. [Articles 47, 48A and 51A\(g\)](#) of the Constitution are as under:

"47. Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health. The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and in particular, The State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.

48A. (g) Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wild life. The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country.

51A.(g) To protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures."

Apart from the constitutional mandate to protect and improve the environment there are plenty of post independence legislations on the subject but more relevant enactments for our purpose are: The [Water \(Prevention and Control of Pollution Act 1974 \(the Water Act\)](#), The [Air \(Prevention and Control of Pollution\) Act, 1981 \(the Air Act\)](#) and the [Environment Protection Act 1986 \(the Environment Act\)](#). The

Water Act provides for the constitution of the Central Pollution Control Board by the Central Government and the constitution of one State Pollution Control boards by various State Governments in the country. The Boards function under the control of the Governments concerned. *The Water Act* prohibits the use or streams and wells for disposal of polluting matters. Also provides for restrictions on outlets and discharge of effluents without obtaining consent from the Board. Prosecution and penalties have been provided which include sentence of imprisonment. *The Air Act* provides that the Central Pollution Control Board and the State Pollution Control Boards constituted under the later Act shall also perform the powers and functions under the *Air Act*. The main function of the Boards, under the *Air Act*, is to improve the quality of the air and to prevent, control and abate air pollution in the country. We shall deal with the *Environment Act* in the later part of this judgement.

14. In view of the above mentioned constitutional and statutory provisions we have no hesitation in holding that the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle are part of the environmental law of the country.

15. Even otherwise once these principles are accepted as part of the Customary International Law there would be no difficulty in accepting them as part of the domestic law. It is almost accepted proposition of law that the rule of Customary International Law which are not contrary to the municipal law shall be deemed to have been incorporated in the domestic law and shall be followed by the Courts of Law. To support we may refer to Justice H.R. Khanna's opinion in *Addl. Distt. Magistrate Jabalpur vs Shivakant Shukla* (AIR 1976 SC 1207) Jolly George Varghese's case (AIR 1980 SC 470) and *Gramophone Company's case*.”

(ix) Dr. Avinash Ramkrishna Kashiwar V. State of Maharashtra & Ors.;
(2015)5 Mh.L.J.830

“17. It could thus be seen that it appears to be settled position of law that the requirement of previous publication inviting objections and suggestions is not an empty formality. It is with an intention to enable persons likely to be affected , to be informed, so that they may take steps as may be open to them and the objections/suggestions made would be required to be taken into consideration by the authorities before issuing a final notification.”

(x) State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. V. P. Krishnamurthi & Ors.;
(2006)4 SCC 517

“22. There is no dispute that making of Rule 38A is a legislative act and not an administrative act. It is no doubt true that an act which is legislative in character, as contrasted from an executive act or a judicial/quasi-judicial function, does not oblige the observance of rules of natural justice. In *Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal v. State of Maharashtra* [1981 (2) SCC 722], this Court observed:

"We are here not concerned with the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function where the very nature of the function involves the application of the rules of natural justice, or of an administrative function affecting the rights of persons, wherefore, a duty to act fairly. We are concerned with legislative activity; we are concerned with the making of a legislative instrument, the declaration by notification of the government that a certain place shall be a principal market yard for a market area, upon which declaration certain statutory provisions at once spring into action and certain consequences prescribed by statute follow forthwith. The making of the declaration, in the context, is certainly an act legislative in character and does not oblige the observance of the rules of natural justice."

27. A delegated legislation, though legislative in character, will be invalid, on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, if the enabling Act under which the delegated legislation is made, specifically requires observance of the principles of natural justice for doing the act. This was made clear in *Rameshchandra Kachardas Porwal (supra)* itself. In *Cynamide India Ltd., (supra)*, this Court observed :

"Legislative action, plenary or subordinate, is not subject to rules of natural justice. In the case of Parliamentary legislation, the proposition is self-evident. In the case of subordinate legislation, it may happen that Parliament may itself provide for a notice and for a hearing. But, where the legislature has not chosen to provide for any notice or hearing, no one can insist upon it and it will not be permissible to read natural justice into such legislative activity."

**(xi) Cellular Operators Association of India Vs. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and others
(2016)7 SCC 703**

"34. *In State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamoorthy*, (2006) 4 SCC 517, this Court after adverting to the relevant case law on the subject, laid down the parameters of judicial review of subordinate legislation generally thus:-

"15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognised that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds:

(a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation.

(b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India.

(c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India.

(d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act.

(e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment.

(f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules).”

(xii) Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India and Ors.;
(1996)5 SCC 281

“43. There is likelihood that there will be instances of infringement of the main Notification and also of the Management Plans, as and when framed, taking place in different parts of the country. In our opinion, instead of agitating these questions before this Court, now that the general principles have been laid down and are well-established, it will be more appropriate that action with regard to such infringement even if they relate to the violation of fundamental rights, should first be raised before the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over the area in question. We are sure and we expect that each High Court will deal with such issues urgently. Environmental law has now become a specialised field. In the decision which was taken at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held at Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 in which India had also participated, the States had been called upon to develop national laws regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damages.

44. There is 6000 kms long coastline of India. It is the responsibility of the coastal States and Union Territories in which these stretches exist to see that both the notifications are complied with and enforced. Management Plans have to be prepared by the States and approved by the Central Government. If the said plans have been approved, the development can take place only in accordance therewith. Till the preparation and approval of the said plans by virtue of the provisions of the main Notification, no development in the coastal areas within the NDZ can take place. Therefore, it is in the interest of all concerned that the Management Plans are submitted and approved at the earliest.

47. With increasing threat to the environmental degradation taking place in different parts of the country, it may not be possible for any single authority to effectively control the same. Environmental degradation is best protected by the people themselves. In this connection, some of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other environmentalists are doing singular service. Time has perhaps come when the Government can usefully draw upon the resources of such NGOs to help and assist in the implementation of the laws relating to protection of the environment. Under Section 3 of the Act, the Central Government has the power to

constitute one or more authorities for the purposes of exercising and performing such powers and functions, including the power to issue directions under Section 5 of the Act of the Central Government as may be delegated to them.”

12. We would like to place reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay dated 07.10.2021, cited above, which clearly states that the applicant can approach this Tribunal to seek the reliefs prayed before it but it was also mentioned that the period from 19.03.2020 till the date of judgment i.e. 07.10.2021 would be excluded by the Tribunal while considering the delay condonation application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, if permissible in law and clear direction was given that if such an application is moved, the same has to be decided in accordance with law.

13. We find that the main relief which has been prayed by the applicant is with respect to seeking quashing of CRZ Notification dated 18.01.2019. Therefore, under Section 14 of the National Green Tribunal Act, the period of limitation would commence from 18.01.2019 and six months would lapse on 17.07.2019 and the next sixty days would be at discretion of this Tribunal, had the case been filed before us seeking condonation of delay but the applicant in this case had approached the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay on 18.03.2020, as per the oral statement made by the learned counsel for the applicant. That means the date before which the present matter could have been filed under Section 14 is 17.09.2019, while this has been filed on 27.02.2022, which is much beyond the period of limitation.

14. We would like to consider the plea taken by the learned counsel for the applicant with respect to one of the reliefs falling under Section 15 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 i.e. challenging the CZMPs under Section 15 of the National Green Tribunal Act and hence claiming the period of limitation of five years. It is argued by the learned counsel for

the applicant that the said relief would mean that earlier prepared CZMPs should be taken into consideration while making appraisal of the project to be cleared instead of the CZMPs prepared under CRZ Notification of 2019. Therefore, it should be treated to be covered under 'restitution' which is one of the grounds in Section 15 of the National Green Tribunal Act.

15. For the sake of convenience, we would like to quote Section 15 of the Act, which reads as follows:

“15 Relief, compensation and restitution. - (1) *The Tribunal may, by an order, provide,-*

(a) relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in the Schedule I (including accident occurring while handling any hazardous substance);

(b) for restitution of property damaged;

(c) for restitution of the environment for such area or areas, as the Tribunal may think fit.

(2) The relief and compensation and restitution of property and environment referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) shall be in addition to the relief paid or payable under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (6 of 1991).

(3) No application for grant of any compensation or relief or restitution of property or environment under this section shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within a period of five years from the date on which the cause for such compensation or relief first arose:

Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.

(4) The Tribunal may, having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment, divide the compensation or relief payable under separate heads specified in Schedule II so as to provide compensation or relief to the claimants and for restitution of the damaged property or environment, as it may think fit.

(5) Every claimant of the compensation or relief under this Act shall intimate to the Tribunal about the application filed to, or, as the case may be, compensation or relief received from, any other court or authority.”

16. After having gone through the above provision, we find that the Tribunal may, by an order, provide for restitution of property damaged

and for restitution of the environment for such area or areas, as the Tribunal may think fit. In the present case, therefore, we do not find that Section 15 would be invocable. Hence, the period of limitation of five years does not appear to be convincing to us.

17. In view of legal position, cited above, we do not find this application worthy to be allowed. Accordingly, it is rejected. Consequently, Original Application No.32 of 2022 (WZ) stands dismissed being barred by limitation.

Dinesh Kumar Singh, JM

Dr. Vijay Kulkarni, EM

January 18, 2023
I.A. NO.32/2022 (WZ)